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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of: 
J. C., a person under 
eighteen years of age 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs. 
Juanita Cruz, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i Case No. 900162-CA 
: Priority No. 4 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 78-2a-3(2)(c) and 78-3a-51 (1953), 
as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Juvenile Court's decision to terminate 
the parental rights of appellant in her child J.C. on the ground 
of abandonment was properly supported by clear and convincing 
evidence. The standard of review for a decision involving 
termination of parental rights was set forth in State in Interest 
of J.R.T. v. Timperly: "The decision ... will be disturbed on 
review only if the findings are clearly erroneous, i.e. if the 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence.M 750 P.2d 
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1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1988). See also Utah R. Civ. Pro. 52 (a). 
2. Whether, even if the evidence to which appellant 
objects had been excluded, the record contains sufficient 
evidence to support the Juvenile Court's Findings and Order. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULE 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-48 (1953) provides in relevant part: 
(l)The court may decree a termination of all 
parental rights with respect to one or both 
parents if the court finds either (a), (b), 
(c), or (d) as follows: 
... 
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned 
the child. It is prima facie evidence of 
abandonment that the parent or parents, 
although having legal custody of the child, 
have surrendered physical custody of the 
child, and for a period of six months 
following the surrender have not manifested 
to the child or the person having the 
physical custody of the child a firm 
intention to resume physical custody or to 
make arrangements for the care of the child. 
2. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides in relevant part: 
...Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 15, 1989, the State of Utah filed a 
petition in the Third District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake City 
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seeking the termination of the parental rights of Juanita Cruz in 
her minor child J.C. The matter came before the Honorable Olof 
A. Johansson in a hearing held January 26, 1990• The Court filed 
its Findings and Order terminating the mother's parental rights 
on the grounds of abandonment on February 15, 1990. The mother 
sought review of the Findings and Order, and filed a notice of 
appeal on March 16, 1990. A docketing statement was filed April 
9, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the termination of Juanita Cruz's 
parental rights in her natural child J.C, who at the time of the 
termination hearing was 10 years old. J.C. is mentally retarded 
and has a hearing disability. 
At the termination hearing, the State called as a 
witness Cathy Haderlie, a social worker with the Utah Division of 
Family Services (DFS), who testified that she had been J.C.'s 
case worker for nearly two years. Tr. at 14, 15. Since J.C. had 
been in State custody prior to her involvement with his case, Ms. 
Haderlie derived some of the information to which she testified 
from J.C.'s DFS case file. Ms. Cruz's attorney noted a 
continuing objection to this testimony on the grounds that it was 
hearsay. The court admitted the testimony under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 803 (6). The evidence to which Ms. Cruz objected 
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included testimony that J.C. came into state custody in 1984, and 
that his mother had visited with J.C. eight times in 1986 and 
three times in 1987. Tr. at 9#11. In addition she testified as 
to J.C.'s behavioral problems as documented by his previous case 
workers. Tr. at 13. She also testified that Juanita Cruz failed 
to complete three treatment plans ordered by the same juvenile 
court in 1986-87. Tr. at 14-15. At the request of the State's 
attorney, the judge took judicial notice of the treatment plans, 
which appeared in the court file. Tr. at 14-15. 
In addition to Ms. Haderlie's testimony, the state 
submitted as an exhibit a compilation prepared by Ms. Haderlie of 
relevant information in J.C.'s DFS file. See Exhibit I. Ms. 
Cruz's attorney objected to the reference in the exhibit to a 
conversation between a Child Protective Services worker and an 
informant regarding J.C. and his mother. The reference was 
stricken from the document, and the judge admitted the exhibit 
with no further objections from Ms. Cruz's attorney. Tr. at 22-
25. 
Besides the evidence Ms. Cruz claims was erroneously 
admitted, Ms. Haderlie offered considerable testimony regarding 
her personal observations. She told the court that during the 
time she had been involved in the case, Juanita Cruz had not 
visited her son or sent him any gifts, cards or other 
correspondence, that she contributed nothing to his financial 
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support, that she made no inquiries concerning his health# and 
that she did not even know how old he was. Tr. at 15, 18, 16. 
She testified that there was no parent-child bond between J.C. 
and his mother, and that Ms. Cruz's lack of affirmative 
involvement with J.C. was very atypical even among parents of 
children in State custody. Tr. at 22. As to visitation, she 
testified that Ms. Cruz called her in April 1989 to ask if she 
could see J.C. Ms. Haderlie said she denied the request because 
she felt a visit would not be in J.C.'s best interest, inasmuch 
as he had been placed in a foster home three days previously and 
was going through a major adjustment period. Tr. at 17. 
According to Ms. Haderlie, Ms. Cruz called her in May 1989 to ask 
for the name of a lawyer, and again in November to express anger 
over having received a summons in connection with the State's 
petition to terminate her parental rights. I^ i. Ms. Haderlie 
testified that at the time of the hearing, J.C. had been in a 
stable foster home for nine months, that his foster parents had 
worked professionally with the mentally handicapped and possessed 
skills necessary to deal with J.C.'s disabilities, and that the 
family loved him and was anxious to adopt him. Tr. at 28, 18, 
19. In addition she stated that according to her observations, 
J.C.'s speech and behavioral problems had improved dramatically 
over the previous year. Tr. at 13-14. 
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Ms. Cruz's own testimony verified that she had not 
visited with J.C. since 1987. Tr. at 42. She said that DFS 
workers repeatedly told her that she could not visit J.C. Id. 
When asked why she had not sent J.C. any gifts or cards, she 
maintained that DFS prevented her. Tr. at 47-48. She was unable 
to correctly recall J.C.'s birthdate. Tr. at 47. Although at 
one point she stated that she had learned some sign language in 
order to be able to communicate with J.C, she was unable to 
demonstrate any proficiency. Tr. at 46-47. She also verified 
that she had not completed the court-ordered treatment plans. 
Tr. at 45. No other witnesses were called on Ms. Cruz's behalf. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although Ms. Cruz contends that the trial court had 
insufficient evidence to support its findings, the record is 
clear that the elements of abandonment were established by 
properly admitted testimony, The facts which Ms. Cruz 
characterizes as hearsay were in fact within the personal 
knowledge of the witnesses, including Ms. Cruz, or were otherwise 
properly before the court. The evidence was clear and convincing 
both to create the statutory presumption of abandonment and to 
meet the test for abandonment set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
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However, even if the evidence to which Ms. Cruz 
specifically objects had been erroneously admitted, the juvenile 
court's decision should nevertheless be upheld under the harmless 
error rule, since there was no reasonable likelihood that the 
court's decision to terminate Ms. Cruz's parental rights would 
have been any different without the challenged evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BASED UPON OVERWHELMING, PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE, 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER WERE NOT 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A. Clear and Convincing Admissible Evidence Supported the Trial 
Court's Finding of Abandonment and Order Terminating 
Appellant's Parental Rights• 
It is undisputed that, as Ms, Cruz points out, the 
relationship between parent and child is a fundamental right 
protected by both the United States and Utah Constitutions. See 
In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (1977). However, that right is not 
without limits, especially where the conduct of parents is 
seriously detrimental to children. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
observed, "[W]e are mindful that deprivation of parental rights 
is drastic action. Yet at the same time the lives and futures of 
[children] are in limbo, and their interests, too, must be 
considered and hopefully some permanency and stability found for 
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them." In Interest of S.R. and B.R. v. G.R., 735 P.2d 53, 57 
(1987). 
Utah statutes provide for the termination of parental 
rights if the juvenile court finds that a parent has abandoned 
her child. According to Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-48 (l)(b) : 
It is prima facie evidence of abandonment 
that the parent or parents, although having 
legal custody of the child, have surrendered 
physical custody of the child, and for a 
period of six months following the surrender 
have not manifested to the child or to the 
person having the physical custody of the 
child a firm intention to resume physical 
custody or to make arrangements for the care 
of the child. 
Under the statute, the party seeking termination—in 
this case, the State—needs only to establish that a prima facie 
case exists to create a presumption of abandonment. The burden 
then shifts to the parent to rebut that presumption. See State in 
Interest of J.CO. v. Anderson, 734 P.2d 458 (Utah 1987); State 
in Interest of J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Ut. App. 
1988). 
In Interest of J.CO., the parents had left their 
children in the custody of other families for approximately two 
years. Although they visited the children on rare occasions and 
at one point expressed interest in regaining custody, the trial 
court nevertheless held that they had abandoned the children. The 
Utah Supreme Court uph€*ld the decision, noting that "there is no 
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evidence upon which the trial judge could rely, except the 
Andersons' assertions that they have not abandoned the children, 
in holding that the prima facie evidence of abandonment had been 
rebutted." Jki. at 462. Similarly, in Timperly, the father was 
unable to satisfactorily account for his failure to visit or 
communicate with his children, whom he had left in state foster 
care for fifteen months. According to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
"These facts, under the statute, constitute prima facie evidence 
of abandonment. In order to rebut the presumption of abandonment, 
the duty was upon appellant to manifest a firm intention to resume 
physical custody of, or make arrangements for the care of, J.R.T. 
within the six month period." Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1237. 
As to the instant case, Ms. Cruz's own testimony that 
she had not visited or otherwise communicated with J.C. since 
1987, plus Ms. Haderlie's unchallenged, properly admitted 
testimony regarding her experiences as J.C.'s case worker, 
establish clearly the presumption of abandonment. However, the 
presumption was not rebutted by Ms. Cruz. While it is conceded 
that Ms. Cruz expressed interest in seeing J.C. in April 1989, she 
was unable to explain her long period of inaction (which greatly 
exceeded the six months required under the statute) to the judge's 
satisfaction. Although Ms.Cruz testified that DFS denied her any 
opportunity to visit or communicate with her child, the judge's 
findings indicate that he simply did not find her testimony 
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credible. See Findings and Order at 3. This was clearly his 
prerogative as the trier of fact. In In re J. Children, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that since the trial court hears the evidence 
in person, it occupies an advantaged position. Because of this, 
the court observed, the trial court is in the best position to 
judge the credibility of witnesses. 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1983). 
See also Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah 1977). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) specifically acknowledges that 
"due regard shall be given to the trial court to judge the 
credibility of witnesses." 
It is also clear that Ms. Cruz's two requests for 
visitation in two years hardly constitute a manifestation of firm 
intent to resume physical custody or make arrangements for a 
child's care. See, e.g., Interest of J.CO. In Ms. Cruz's case, 
the court was also negatively impressed with the fact that, in 
spite of her testimony, Ms. Cruz had failed to develop sign 
language skills with which to communicate with J.C. See Findings 
and Order at 3. Ms. Cruz herself testified as to her failure to 
complete the treatment plans designed to reunite her with J.C. 
Tr. at 45. These facts provide clear and convincing evidence that 
at no time did Ms. Cruz manifest a firm intent to resume physical 
custody of J.C. or to make arrangements for his care. Although in 
her brief Ms. Cruz argties at some length that DFS erred in denying 
her requests for visitation, it is a fact that at any time she 
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could have sought review of the agency's decision. See, e.g. Utah 
Code Ann. S 48-3a-47 (1953) (providing that a parent may petition 
the juvenile court for change or modification of a custody decree 
upon a change in circumstances). In any case, however, this 
appeal deals with whether the juvenile court's findings regarding 
J.C.'s abandonment and order of termination were clearly 
erroneous. This court is therefore not the place to raise an 
issue regarding the adequacy or fairness of the agency's action. 
In addition to the statutory presumption of 
abandonment, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to 
be used in determining whether a parent has abandoned a child. In 
State in Interest of Summers Children v. Wulffenstein, the Court 
held that to terminate parental rights, a court must determine (1) 
whether the parent's conduct has evidenced a conscious disregard 
for her parental obligations, and (2) whether that disregard has 
led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship. 560 P.2d 
331, 334 (1977). According to the Court, abandonment may be 
proven objectively from the actions of the parent as well as from 
the parent's expressions of subjective intent. See Interest of 
J.CO., 734 P.2d at 462. The Court has also noted that, 
••Abandonment can only result from inaction or a course of conduct 
for which the parent is personally responsible." See In re J. 
Children, 664 P.2d at 1159. 
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In Interest of J.C.O., the Court held that the lower 
court's finding of conscious disregard and subsequent destruction 
of the parent child relationship was supported by evidence that 
the parents had never provided financially for their children, and 
that they had taken only a superficial interest in their 
children's welfare• W at 462. See also State in Interest of 
J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d L234 (Ut. App. 1988). Similarly, in 
Matter of Adoption of Guzman, 586 P.2d 418 (1978), the Court 
upheld the termination of a mother's parental rights on evidence 
that she had visited her children only five or six times in four 
years, that she had sent no gifts, letters, or communications to 
her children on Christmas or their birthdays, and had made no 
phone calls or other attempts to contact them. 
In the instant case, even without the evidence 
appellant claims was inadmissible hearsay, the record contains 
abundant evidence from which the juvenile court could have found 
abandonment. Ms. Cruz herself testified that she had not seen 
J.C. since 1987, and that she had not sent him birthday or 
Christmas cards. While she maintained that she had made attempts 
to contact J.C. but had been prevented from doing so, the court 
found her testimony unpersuasive. See Findings and Order at 3. 
Ms. Haderlie, testifying from her own observations, stated that 
Ms. Cruz did not contribute to J.C's support, that she never 
inquired about his health, that there was no parent-child bond 
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between her and J.C., and that she manifested an unusual lack of 
affirmative involvement with J.C. These facts provide obvious 
support for the conclusion that Ms. Cruz consciously disregarded 
her parental obligations. In short, the record indicates a clear 
and convincing evidentiary basis for the judge's finding that Ms. 
Cruz's conduct toward the boy was a substantial departure from 
normal parental behavior, and that her conduct led to a breakdown 
of the child-parent relationship. See Findings and Order at 3. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, an additional 
consideration in the decision to terminate parental rights is the 
best interest of the child. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (1982); 
Timperly, 750 P.2d at 1238. The Timperly court wrote: 
The second prong of the objective abandonment 
test, whether the parental disregard led to 
the destruction of the parent-child 
relationship, satisfies the need separately 
to consider the best interest of the child. 
If the parent-child relationship has been 
destroyed by the parent's conduct, or lack of 
conduct, it is usually in the best interest 
of the child to terminate that relationship 
and allow the child an opportunity to 
establish a meaningful relationship with 
loving, responsible parents. 
Id. at 1238. 
In the instant case, as in Timperly# the child has made 
considerable progress with his foster family, who love him and 
wish to adopt him. See id. at 1238-39. Here, the juvenile court 
judge's determination that J.C.'s best interests required 
-13-
termination of his natural mother's parental rights was based upon 
Ms. Haderlie's testimony regarding J.C's improvement while in the 
care of his foster family. These observations were derived from 
Ms. Haderlie's own experience as J.C's case worker, and, again, 
constitute clear and convincing evidence. 
B. Other Findings Challenged by Appellant Were Supported By 
Competent Evidence. 
Appellant contends that certain other findings of the 
trial court were not supported by properly admitted evidence. 
First, she claims that there was no competent evidence to 
establish the chronology of events surrounding J.C's placement 
with DFS. Second, she maintains that there was only hearsay 
testimony to support the judge's finding that Ms. Cruz failed to 
comply with the court-ordered treatment plans. Finally, she 
argues that no competent evidence was admitted regarding J.C's 
flinching and bedwetting following visitation with his mother. 
With regard to the evidence dealing with J.C's 
flinching and bedwetting, that information was included in the 
exhibit prepared by Ms. Haderlie. See Exhibit I. Ms. Cruz's 
attorney failed to make a specific hearsay objection to that 
exhibit as a whole although she had ample opportunity to do so, 
Ms. Cruz did object to one sentence in the exhibit without 
specifying grounds for the objection, and the judge deleted the 
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sentence. However, when he specifically asked her whether she had 
any further objections, she replied that she did not. Tr. at 25. 
The law is well established that a party must make a timely, 
specific objection in order to preserve an issue for appeal. See, 
e.g., Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 
1984). 
Ms. Cruz contends that the judge erred in referring to 
J.C's placement with Topham's Tiny Tots in 1982 and his subsequent 
placement with the State. However, as the court noted, the 
information was already part of the child's court record. Tr. at 
7. J.C. had come before the court previously, and its 
jurisdiction over him was continuing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-
40 (1953). In addition, a court may take notice of its own 
records. In Interest of S.J.—also a termination case—the Utah 
Supreme Court wrote: 
The evidence was not hearsay because the 
witness was testifying as to evidence already 
part of the record in a prior proceeding in 
this case, which resulted in the placement of 
the child in a foster home. The court took 
judicial notice of the prior proceeding, 
which he may do under U.C.A. 78-25-1(3) as 
interpreted in State v. Bates [citation 
omitted]. 
576 P.2d at 1283. The introduction of Ms. Haderlie's testimony 
regarding how J.C. came to be in State foster care was therefore 
properly admitted. 
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As to Ms, Cruz's failure to comply with the treatment 
plans, Ms. Cruz herself acknowledged her failure to complete the 
plans in the following statement: "I'll do anything that I need 
to, learn all the—what I wanted, I never denied none of those 
treatment plans, you know I wanted to do them and stuff, but then 
ladies come, you know, and then start fading away." Tr. at 46. 
In light of Ms. Cruz's admission, the court's finding was not 
clearly erroneous, but was properly supported. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT'S ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE 
CHALLENGED BY APPELLANT 
WAS AT WORST HARMLESS ERROR. 
As the record in this case reveals, ample evidence was 
presented at the hearing to justify the trial judge's finding that 
Ms. Cruz abandoned J.C., even if evidence taken from J.C.'s DFS 
files had been excluded. That being the case, even if an error in 
admitting the evidence had been made, the judge's decision shoxild 
be left undisturbed under the harmless error rule. 
A statement of the harmless error rule was given by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in State in Interest of C.Y. v. Yates; 
The pivotal question is whether the error 
resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant 
reversal of the termination order. An error 
is prejudicial "only if a review of the 
record persuades the [appellate] court that 
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without the error there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant. ',f [citations omitted, emphasis 
in original] A reasonable likelihood is Ma 
probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome. ... Therefore, we 
must review the record and determine whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
outcome of the termination hearing would have 
been more favorable to [the appellant] had 
the juvenile court not [erred]. 
• '
r
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that the lower court's judgment terminating a father's parental 
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unchallenged testimony supporting the judge's finding of 
abandonment, it is clear that there was no reasonable likelihood 
that his decision would have been different in the absence of this 
evidence• The appellant in Interest of S.J* made a claim of error 
analogous to Ms. Cruz's, maintaining that the lower court had 
erred in considering facts outside the record. The Utah Supreme 
Court responded that M[t]he petitions filed were to terminate 
parental rights and the evidence admitted reasonably related to 
appellant's [sic] ability to care for their children. The 
evidence is overwhelming that the parents cannot adequately 
support and maintain their minor children and on the facts of this 
case we feel compelled to sustain the court's order." The clear 
implication of this holding is that if competent evidence exists 
to support a court's decision, the decision should stand. The 
holding in Interest of S.J, has relevance to the instant case, in 
that the record of Ms. Cruz's termination hearing contains 
overwhelming evidence that she abandoned her child. On that 
basis, the trial court's decision should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case is replete with clear and 
convincing evidence that Ms. Cruz abandoned her child. While Ms. 
Cruz asserts that very little competent evidence was presented at 
-18-
1 termination hearing • support the cour findings, the 
record demonstrates al judge's 
findings. 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah 
respectfully requests tna : une 
Juvenile Court to terminate Appellant's parental rights her 
DATED t h i s </ f d*y ^J4JLS?LM^1 , ) . 
•r 
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